

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY *EGGA-81840*

TELETYPED INFORMATION REPORT

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CLASSIFICATION <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">S-E-C-R-E-T</div>		DISSEMINATION CONTROLS <div style="text-align: center;">NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL</div>	
TDCS - 104551		OUT - DATE - TIME - GROUP 25 SEPT. 1956	
COUNTRY WEST GERMANY		PRECEDENCE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE	
SUBJECT EFFECT OF RADFORD MEMORANDUM		PLACE ACQUIRED GERMANY, FRANKFURT	
DATE OF INFORMATION AUGUST 1956		DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006	
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT (TENTATIVE) 2			
SOURCE (EVALUATION DEFINITIVE) WELL PLACED SOURCE (B) WHO RECENTLY TALKED WITH HEUSINGER.			
<p>1. IN AUGUST 1956, SHORTLY AFTER LT. GEN. ADOLF HEUSINGER RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES, HE HAD A LONG PRIVATE INTERVIEW WITH CHANCELLOR KONRAD ADENAUER. THE LATTER EXPRESSED HIMSELF AS VERY MUCH DISCOURAGED OVER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WASHINGTON AND OVER HIS OWN POLITICAL PROSPECTS.</p> <p>HEUSINGER TRIED, BUT WITHOUT MUCH SUCCESS, TO ALLAY ADENAUER'S FEARS CONCERNING AMERICAN POLICY, CITING HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH OFFICIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (E.G., SECRETARY WILSON AND GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR); ADENAUER STILL FELT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD DECEIVED HIM, AND ALL THE REASSURANCES THAT HEUSINGER BROUGHT BACK DID NOT SHAKE HIS PESSIMISM. THE CHANCELLOR'S GRAVEST CONCERN IS THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AS THE TWO GREATEST ATOMIC WORLD POWERS, WILL EVENTUALLY COME TO AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL SACRIFICE GERMANY AND, POSSIBLY, THE REST OF EUROPE.</p>			
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2. ADENAUER IS CONVINCED THAT CONVENTIONAL TROOP UNITS ARE NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE. THIS IS NOT A PURELY POLITICAL VIEW,BUT IS SHARED BY THE GERMAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP AS WELL, WHO EMPHASIZE THE INABILITY OF NUCLEAR FORCES TO QUELL LOCAL CONFLAGRATIONS SUCH AS THOSE IN ALGERIA, THE SUEZ QUESTION, ETC.

3. ADENAUER FEELS THAT CONTINUATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE MILITARY CONCEPT REPRESENTED BY THE "RADFORD MEMORANDUM" WILL RUIN HIS CHANCE OF WINNING THE NEXT ELECTION. HEUSINGER CONSIDERS THAT IF THE SPD SHOULD COME INTO THE GOVERNMENT AFTER THE 1957 ELECTION, THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT REUNIFICATION WILL BE ACHIEVED BY THE ACCEPTANCE OF GERMAN NEUTRALITY; THIS, HE SAYS, COULD SET THE STAGE FOR A COUP D'ETAT SIMILAR TO THAT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1948. IF THIS HAPPENS AND AMERICAN DEFENSE IS GEARED TO THE NUCLEAR CONCEPT, HE DOUBTS THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD STEP IN TO ASSIST THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC FORCES. THE USE OF TROOPS EQUIPPED WITH ATOMIC WEAPONS MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO HANDLE LOCAL SITUATIONS AND KEEP THEM LOCAL.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE.

END OF MESSAGE.

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